An increasing number of reports of online auction fraud are of growing concern to auction operators and participants. In this research, we discuss reserve price shilling, where a bidder shills in order to avoid paying auction house fees, rather than to drive up the price of the final bid. We examine the effect that premium bids, since they are linked with reserve price shill bids, have upon the final selling price. We use 10,260 eBay auctions during April 2001, and identify 1,389 auctions involving 493 sellers and 1,314 involved in concurrent auctions that involving the exact same item. We find that premium bidding occurs 23% of the time, in 263 of the 1,389 auctions. Using a theoretical perspective involving valuation signals, we show that other bidders may view high bids as signals that an item is worth more. Thus, they may be willing to pay more for the item than items that do not receive premium bids. The implications are disturbing in that sellers may be more motivated to enter a shill bid in order to drive up the final price in an online auction. We also examine and report on alternative hypotheses involving winner's curse and the possibility of reserve price shill bids. Our results are developed in the context of a weighted least squares regression model that predicts an item selling price-to-average selling price ratio.
INTRODUCTION
One of the hardest types of online auction fraud to detect is shilling. Shilling occurs when a seller bids on her own auction in an effort to increase the price other bidders need to pay to win the auction. Because it is inherently deceptive (in that the seller hides her identity and pretends to be a bidder in order to make money from real bidders), shilling is considered to be an instance of criminal fraud in the United States and elsewhere, with the most severe cases punishable by a jail term or heavy fines.
Shilling is typically defined in terms of competitive shilling, where the seller starts bidding so that the final bidder is forced to bid higher than would otherwise be necessary to win the auction item. Various researchers (e.g., Riley and Samuelson 1981; Wang, Hidvegi and Whinston 2001) have pointed out that, with competitive shilling, the final bidder is motivated to shave some surplus off the highest bidder by making that final bidder pay more. However, Kauffman and Wood (forthcoming) discuss other motivations for shilling and illustrate the prevalence of reserve price shilling, which is motivated by the avoidance of auction house fees. Online auction houses, like eBay, typically charge a fee that is determined by the amount a seller sets for the initial bid, while bidding is typically free. By setting a low starting bid, and then secretly bidding that amount up by pretending to be a bidder, sellers can save money when selling goods in online auctions. Furthermore, the chance of detection is low, since the names and faces of the actual bidders are hidden from the other bidders, unlike a typical traditional live auction where everyone can see who is bidding. Kauffman and Wood go on to describe how a premium bid, a bid which is higher than other bids for the same item in different auctions, is often a reserve price shill bid.
There has never been an empirical study to determine the effect of reserve price shill bids on final prices in an online auction. In this research, we ask the following questions:
□ How may the final selling price in an online auction be affected by the existence of a shill bid?
□ What theories can help to explain why a shill bid may or may not affect the final selling price of an item in an online auction?
□ What are the implications of any effects that a shill bid has on the final selling price in an online auction?
In this research, we will test contradictory predictions based on winner's curse theory and signaling theory. Using a weighted least squares (WLS) estimation model, we discover that the existence of a premium bid in an online auction has a positive effect on the final selling price of the auction. If premium bids are reserve price shill bids, then this effect may increase the motivation for shilling activity among sellers.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
We next examine literature that provides the theoretical background for our understanding of how to model premium bidding and shilling as they relate to how final prices are established in online auctions. There are several conflicting opinions stand out based on works in the reserve price shilling literature, the winner's curse literature and the signaling literature for how a premium bid should affect the final price of an auction item.
Reserve Price Shilling and Premium Bidding
Shilling is the act of a seller or seller agent bidding on his own item in an effort to receive more for that item. Sinha and Greenleaf (2000) analyze optimal reserves and shilling related to bidder aggressiveness. They identify shilling as an issue because of the growing popularity of online auctions. Kauffman and Wood (2000) empirically demonstrate this by showing the characteristics of auctions that receive a premium bid. Wang, Hidvegi and Whinston (2001) modeled the basis for strong motivation for shilling to occur in electronic auctions on the Internet. They point out how traditional auction theory assumes a small number of identifiable bidders that bid in a single isolated auction that cannot be repeated, and that buyers and sellers possess perfect information to inform their transaction-making, and do not collude. In contrast, online auctions have many repeated auctions and many bidders. Also, identities of the bidders and sellers are masked behind a "handle," so often there is no way to discover the identity of the trading partner.
Kauffman and Wood (forthcoming) discuss premium bidding in detail. They define a premium bid as a bid in an auction that meets four criteria: (1) there must be two auctions selling the exact same item; (2) one auction, Auction A ends after the other auction, Auction B; (3) Auction A receives a bid from a bidder, when that bidder could have placed a lower bid on Auction B to become the winning bidder at that time; and finally, (4) the bidder who placed the high bid in Auction A did not bid on both auctions.
Although the requirements seem highly restrictive, the intuition behind this definition is clear. A bidder ought to be motivated to bid on the auction that ends first, since there is less time left in the auction and, thus, less of a chance that the bidder's bid will be beaten. Kauffman and Wood (forthcoming) discuss how such premium bids received in an auction are likely to be shill bids. Their logic involves an assessment of the consistency of a bidder's bidding behavior.
Bidders who enter premium bids are: (1) more likely to buy items from fewer sellers; (2) more likely to drop out early from the auction; (3) more likely to bid in statistically higher increments compared to the previous bidder; and (4) less likely to win an auction.
Kauffman and Wood discuss how these four stylized facts are consistent with reserve price shilling, and not consistent with other possible explanations such as seller preferences (in that they are unlikely to win and drop out early) or bounded rationality (in that they concentrate on fewer sellers and bid in high increments as opposed to default increments). Furthermore, the authors also show that the likelihood of an auction receiving a premium bid can be detected prior to the beginning of an auction by making predictions that are consistent with reserve price shilling.
Kauffman and Wood develop a reserve price shilling theory that describes how auction sellers are motivated to shill in order to avoid auction house fees, since listing fees are often a function of starting bid price. This is different than the traditional view of competitive shilling, described by Riley and Samuelson (1981) , where the seller is motivated to shill in order to capture more of the surplus from the buyer. In this case, the shill is unlikely to stay until the end of the auction.
Whereas Kauffman and Wood (forthcoming) use reserve price shilling theory to predict auctions that will receive a premium bid, in this research we examine what effect a premium bid has on the selling price (or final bid) for an auction item after the premium bid has been submitted.
The Winner's Curse Adjustment and Premium Bidding
Cox and Isaac (1984) describe the logic behind the winner's curse in auctions. Since bidders derive a common valuation of an item from a distribution of values, only the highest valuation will result in a bid that wins the auction. As a result, the highest valuation will typically be above the expected common value of most auction participants. Cox and Isaac explain how the winner's curse can be alleviated by bidding on an item based upon a bidder's valuation for that item conditional upon winning that item, rather than simply bidding the pure valuation. This exact adjustment can be derived using Nash equilibrium analysis and is called the symmetric risk-neutral Nash equilibrium (SRNNE) adjustment. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) test for a winner's curse adjustment in rare coin auctions on eBay. Using a winner's curse test advocated by Milgrom and Weber (1982) , the authors find that eBay participants do adjust somewhat for the winner's curse. Thus, based upon research done in traditional auctions, and the fact that Bajari and Hortascu found evidence of a winner's curse adjustment in an online auction setting, we also should see a decrease in the bid levels for items as a buyer's experience with online auctions increases.
Carrying this logic forward from Cox and Isaac into the present work, we expect that an exceptionally high bid for an item should make other bidders bid less. Why? Because an auction item that attracts aggressive bidders should increase the likelihood of observing a winner's curse, which, in turn, will increase the SRNNE adjustment that other bidders make when bidding on the item.
The "Signaling Effect" and Premium Bidding
Bapna (2003), Roth and Ockenfels (2002) and Varian (2000) investigate bid sniping, which occurs when a bidder waits until the final moments of the auction before bidding. Based on empirical data collected prior to 2000, Varian (2000) notes that 37% of bids occurred in the last minute, and 12% in the last 10 seconds of an auction, which shows that bid sniping behavior was already evident earlier in the evolution of the eBay auction. Roth and Ockenfels note that bids can be seen as valuation signals for an item. The longer the signal is delayed for an item, especially if the signal is avoided until the final bids, the lower the price will be. Bid sniping and letting chance determine the outcome is better for both players than bidding high early in the auction and then precipitating a bidding war because the signals suggest that an item is worth more than the current bid rate. Bapna (2003) suggests that there are a number of mechanism design options that permit auction intermediaries to refine the incentives with respect to lastminute bidding that enhance the benefits for the intermediary itself, as well as the participants of its market.
Building on Roth and Ockenfels' valuation signal theory, we believe that if a signal is received to suggest that an item is worth more than the current bid rate, then this should act as a signal to other bidders that an item is valuable. This should tend to drive up the final bid that an item in an auction receives. Note that this is the opposite of the winner's curse extension, which states that a high bid will increase a bidder's winner's curse adjustment, and drive down the overall final bid of an item in an auction.
HYPOTHESES
The purpose of this research is to examine electronic auctions with premium bids to determine their effects on the final bid amount. We begin with an extension to the winner's curse theory. In this theory, Cox and Isaac (1984) discuss how a large number of bidders indicates a greater likelihood that a bidder will receive a winner's curse. To alleviate this problem, sophisticated bidders will reduce their maximum bid as more bidders enter the bidding process.
Taking this logic further, sophisticated bidders should also adjust to a greater extent if there is an exuberant bidder who enters a premium bid, the logic being that a bidder who is bidding high will increase the probability of a winner's curse, since any winner will have to beat the exuberant bidder. Once the other bidders detect a premium bid, winner's curse theory suggests that the SRNNE adjustment for other bidders will increase. This leads to our first hypothesis.
□ Hypothesis 1 (The Winner's Curse Hypothesis):
The existence of a premium bid within an auction will decrease the amount of the final bid on an auction item.
Conversely, Roth and Ockenfels (2002) propose that bids act as signals to other bidders about the quality of the item, which also includes the quality of service and honesty of the seller who is describing the item. As such, a premium bid may inflate the final price of an item, as bidders take the high bid as a signal of higher quality from buyers that may possess more information about the seller, the product, etc. This leads to our second hypothesis:
□ Hypothesis 2 (The Valuation Signal Hypothesis): The existence of a premium bid within an auction will increase the amount of the final bid on an auction item.
Finally, it is possible that rational and sophisticated bidders either believe that they already know as much as any other bidder, or that they understand that reserve price shilling can occur.
As such, bidders will ignore the presence of a premium bid, and the final bid for an item will end up being the same as it would have been without the premium bid. This leads to our third hypothesis.
□ Hypothesis 3 (The Rational Bidder Hypothesis): Observed premium bidding activity in electronic auctions has no effect on the final bid amount.
Thus, we have three competing hypotheses, each based upon theory, that predict different outcomes for the effect of a premium bid on the final selling price in an auction. Note that Kauffman and Wood (2000) have shown that the premium bids hardly win (8% of the time)
compared with non-premium bids (23% of the time). When other bidders detect the premium bid on an item, then, we question what will be the effect that this has on their final bid.
EMPIRICAL MODEL, DATA AND ESTIMATION ISSUES
We now turn to the development of an empirical model to investigate the effects of premium bids on the final selling price of items that are transacted in online auctions. We also discuss the data that we collected for this study, as well as a number of issues that deserve attention prior to our estimation of the data, to ensure that we are appropriately handling the information structure of the empirical setting that is being considered.
Basic Specification of the Empirical Model
The starting point for our discussion is the primary hypothesized relationship that we presented in the last section: we argued that selling price, specified as the variable SellingPrice, is a function of whether an auction for an item is observed to received premium bids, also specified as the variable AuctionHasPremiumBid. Table 1 presents definitions for these two variables, and some others that we will discuss in greater depth in the development of our estimation model. (Kauffman and Wood, 2003) . The general idea is that tools similar to the data collection software agent that we used permit "rifle shot" targeting of data items to be collected from much larger stores of data, such as are available on the Internet, to match the precise requirements for examining effects that are only likely to occur under a certain set of quasi-controlled conditions.
Estimation Issues for the Empirical Model
A number of estimation issues arise in our technical specification of an empirical model. In the paragraphs below, we discuss issues of correlation and multicollinearity, estimation efficiency and unobservable characteristics, and our approach to dealing with heteroskedastic residuals through the use of weighted least squares (WLS). We also discuss the statistical power that will characterize our tests of the hypotheses.
Efficiency, Unobservable Characteristics, Heteroskedasticity, and Weights. Kennedy (1998, p 15.) identifies estimation efficiency as a means of obtaining a best linear unbiased estimator in linear regression. An efficient estimator is "best" in the sense that it takes advantage of all of the relevant information that is associated with a given estimation problem. As a result, the model that is formulated will capture the relationship between a dependent variable and multiple dependent variables, resulting in the lowest possible error term or regression residual.
An unbiased estimator is an estimator where the residuals are "constant:" they will be evenly distributed among all variables, without undue bias associated with any single independent variable. Typically, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models assume that the residuals are distributed evenly relative to the independent variables with a mean of zero.
To maintain estimation efficiency, we analyzed this data set at the auction level. However, there are likely to be unobservable seller level characteristics, such as the propensity to shill, quality of presentation, feeling toward partners, and so on that cannot be directly observed. If these unobservable user characteristics are indeed evenly distributed among all users-a reasonable entry assumption in this research-then analysis at the user level ought to exhibit homoskedasticity of the residuals. As a result, the regression residuals will very likely capture these unobservable characteristics, and the error terms will still be evenly distributed.
However, if the analysis occurs at the user level, leading to homoskedastic residuals by individual, then by mathematical necessity, an analysis that is done to capture an individual's participation in several auctions will result in an information structure problem for estimation.
We expect that the magnitude of the residuals of the highly active users will be smaller than those of the less active users. Moreover, the unobservable characteristics of highly active users are likely to be over-represented in the auction-level analysis, leading to biased estimators. This apparent heteroskedasticity will violate one of the basic assumptions necessary for OLS regression analysis.
Information structure problems with regression residuals can arise from both known sources and unknown sources of heteroskedasticity. We will argue in this study that the sub-sample size for each seller's bid-making participation in eBay auctions is a known source of heteroskedasticity. Following Duliba, Kauffman, and Lucas (2001), to test for known-source heteroskedasticity, we employ employ a test attributable to Goldfeld-Quandt (1965) . This test is performed by splitting the dataset into two subsets and then comparing the error terms of each subset with an F-test. We split the data set into those sellers that have a low number of transactions and those sellers that have a high number of transactions within the dataset. As expected, we find that there is significant heteroskedasticity resulting from the number of transactions that each seller has in the study, as indicated by the Goldfeld-Quandt test (F-statistic = 1.56; p < .001).
To resolve the problem of known-source heteroskedasticity, Wooldridge (2003) suggests applying weights, which will cause some observations to be given more importance than others so as to create the basis for homoskedastic residuals through model estimation. To accomplish this, we weighted each observation in our data set by the inverse of the number of auctions in which that auction's item buyer participated. Thus, each observation of an active buyer is adjusted in weight so that every buyer contributes at the same level, restoring the homoskedasticity of the model, yet still every observation will add information to the regression analysis.
We also tested for heteroskedasticity using a less restrictive test advocated by Breusch and Pagan (1979) that can identify unknown-source heteroskedasticity both before and after weighting the observations. With five degrees of freedom, the test before weighting returns a significant value of χ 2 = 22.4 (p < .001). After correcting for heteroskedasticity by weighting the observation, the test returns a value of χ 2 = 7.5, which is not highly significant (p > .05). Thus, with our correction for a known source of heteroskedasticity, our subsequent Breusch-Pagan test shows no further significant problems with heteroskedasticity.
Collinearity and Multicollinearity. We first examined the pairwise correlations between independent variables. We note that the greatest correlation is 63%, between ln(StartingBid / AverageSellingPrice) and NumberBidders, as shown in Table 2 . Pairwise correlations among all variables are below the criterion level of 90% suggested by Kennedy (1998), where problems may occur. We typically prefer to work with a more conservative cutoff of 70%, and the pairwise correlations in our data are all less than that. Thus, our regression estimates are unlikely to be corrupted due to collinearity between two estimators. Hocking (1996) suggests that any VIF greater than 10 is indicative of multicollinearity. Each of our independent variables measures a VIF of less than 2. Thus, both the condition index test and the VIF test indicate that our coefficient estimates will not be unstable due to multicollinearity.
The Issue of Statistical Power
Earlier, we indicated that there are conflicting theoretical predictions about the effect of a premium bid on the final bid price in an auction. For example, our rational bidder hypothesis predicts that if bidders recognize that a premium bid is a reserve price shill bid, then the premium bid will have little or no effect on the final selling price, and the effect should be insignificant.
However, regression tests are not sufficient to accept a null hypothesis (i.e., a null hypothesis indicates no significant difference from zero). Instead, one should only accept or fail to accept an alternative hypothesis to be true. When we fail to reject the null hypothesis, this does not mean that the null hypothesis is true and the alternative hypothesis is false. If our models indicate some lack of fit in estimation, then we need a way to determine if our models actually are powerful enough to be able to detect significance. Andrews (1989) for example, when a test is significant with a p-value of less than 5%. (This means that there is a 5% probability of a Type I error, and thus a 95% probability of no Type I error.) In this case, we also want to test for the probability of a Type II error. (That occurs when the estimated value of β is statistically the same as zero and the alternative hypothesis is true, but we do not find enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis).
Cohen describes how power analysis exploits the relationships among the four variables involved in statistical inference:
□ N, the sample size is the number of observations. □ α, the significance criterion, often stated in terms of the p-value, is the probability that a Type I error will occur.
□ 1 -β, the statistical power, is the probability that a Type II error will not occur.
□ the population effect size.
Note that the significance of β (based on its relationship to the p-value) is an indicator for whether a Type II error will occur. The population effect size is easily the most complicated of these measures. The effect size begins with estimation by the researcher as to the level of effect.
The smaller the effect size, the more conservative the test.
By using a power test in conjunction with another statistical method, such as weighted least squares regression, we can more fully examine the probabilities of both Type I and Type II errors. Table 3 shows the power analysis for a model with five independent variables and a sample size of 1,389. The table also shows the power analysis for this study's sample size of 1,389 observations of final bids in eBay auction, with R 2 varying from 1% to 4%. Small effects are often difficult to detect because of sample size limitations. However, our data collection methodology allows for larger data sets through its use of a data collection software agent. This also permits our econometric analysis to obtain enough statistical power to determine if the hypothesized relationships exist among the study variables. Models built with sample sizes of 1,389 observations of the dependent variable are powerful relative to the five explanatory variables. This is true to such an extent that, with a restriction of α < .05, there is less than a 0.01% probability of statistically rejecting any relationship with R 2 that is greater than 3%. This matches the requirements set out by Faul and Erdfelder (1992) of a small effect size.
With the results in Table 3 , we illustrate that our tests are powerful, and can statistically accept hypotheses involving a lack of relationship if they are shown to be insignificant by concluding that either: (1) there is no relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable; or (2) the relationship is so small as to be practically and statistically insignificant and, thus, undetectable. Table 4 shows our results from analysis of our empirical model shown in Equation 1, weighted by the seller's number of auctions within our dataset. In Table 4 , we can see that, after using weights to adjust for the idiosyncratic bidding behavior and the attraction of certain sellers, there is a positive effect on price (β 1 = 0.241; std.
RESULTS
dev. = 7.896; p = .001) when an auction receives a premium bid, thus supporting our Valuation Signal Hypothesis. 1 Thus, bidders are influenced to bid higher when they see an auction receiving a premium bid.
Kauffman and Wood (2004) point out that early reserve price shilling behavior has frequently occurred in online auctions, and this research identifies some of the motivation for such behavior. Reserve price shilling reduces the fees paid by the seller, and can have a positive effect on price. Thus, many sellers will be motivated to enter a reserve price shill bid after setting up an auction with a low starting bid. We next discuss how we interpret these results with the thought that premium bids may be indicative of reserve price shilling. We then describe possible alternative interpretations, and why we do not consider those to be as viable.
Interpretation
It is important to be able to recognize premium bids and why they may occur in large part as reserve price shill bids that are entered by the seller under a different identity, or by an agent of the seller. For further insight, Table 5 shows the results of three non-parametric t-tests that compare the bidding activity with auctions that contain a premium bid with those that do not.
Consider the premium bidding comparative statistics in Table 5 , using the variables described in Table 6 . We have already shown that a premium bidder enters a bid amount larger than the typical bidder. Now we examine other statistics with reserve price shilling in mind. Primarily, we expect a reserve price shill to enter a premium bid. Why? Because a bidder who shills on the reserve price (1) does not care about other auctions, but rather only on inflating his own auction's price and (2) the reserve price shill will bid in higher increments in an effort to inflate the minimum selling price of an item, and not the minimum price that the item is likely to sell for.
We expect a reserve price shill to concentrate on fewer sellers. If a seller is likely to shill, then that seller will establish a bidder identity that is used to bid on items from that seller's identities, which would increase the number of auctions per seller where the bidder engages. In Table 5 , we show that bidders enter premium bids bid upon 2.17 different auctions per seller in this dataset, whereas those bidders who were not detected entering premium bids only bid upon 1.39 auctions per seller, a significantly lower number.
We also expect a reserve price shill to drop out of bidding early compared with other bidders.
In Table 5 , we show that reserve price shills drop out, on the average, 4.64 days before the auction ends. Other bidders drop out, on average, 1.85 days before the auction ends. Thus, we see a bidder who enters a premium bid, yet does not want to bid higher.
Finally, we show that when there is a premium bidder who enters a high bid, that premium bidder is less likely to win the auction. For a reserve price shill, we interpret this to mean that the seller will enter a high bid early in the auction, but, of course, the seller will not want to win the auction but rather will want to bid high enough to reduce the risk of a low selling price, but low enough so that other bidders are attracted to the auction.
Alternative Explanations
We now examine two alternative explanations for premium bidding besides reserve price shilling: bounded rationality and seller preference.
Bounded Rationality. It is possible that bidders are confused about the myriad of auctions available on eBay and, thus, may mistakenly bid on products where the ending bid is later and that are selling for more. We find this explanation to be somewhat unlikely for two reasons.
First, Kagel and Richard (2001) show us that inexperienced bidders are more likely to continue with a high bidding and win the auction. Thus, inexperienced bidders, who are most likely to be exhibit the effects of the bounds of their lack of experiential knowledge, are not as likely drop out early, as shown by the test results in Table 5 . Second, eBay places search results in ending date order by default. Figure 1 shows the search results for the "1793 United States half cent."
The bidder's search display lists auctions for this collectible coin at the top of the list that end first, based on "Time Left" in the right-hand column; auctions for the same item that end later are displayed further down in the list.
Figure 1. Search Results for the "1793 United States Half Cent" on eBay
Similarly, if a user simply goes to a category without searching, items are displayed in reverse date order based "Time Left." Thus, it is difficult to imagine that even an inexperienced user would often find a later ending auction before an earlier ending auction. A premium bid may be made by a bidder when another auction that ends earlier is overlooked or ignored by the bidder in favor of an auction selling the same item for a higher price. Given the Web design of eBay that we observe, we believe that premium bidding behavior is difficult to attribute to bounded rationality.
Seller Preference.
Another possibility is that a bidder will enter a high bid because that bidder prefers to transact with one seller over another. However, while this undoubtedly contributes at some level to premium bidding, we contend that seller preference is not the primary driver of premium bidding. With 493 successful sellers and 1,314 bidders, each seller had bids, on average, from 2.7 bidders. Thus, there is a wide dispersion between bidders and sellers in online auctions, too much to indicate that there is one seller who is clearly preferred over another by a majority of bidders at the auction level. In addition, although seller preference can explain how premium bidders may be observed to aggregate around a single seller, seller preference cannot explain why these premium bidders do not end up winning items at the same level. Nor does it explain why these premium bidders tend to drop out earlier. As such, we conclude that reserve price shilling as a motivation for premium bidding is more consistent with the statistical analysis shown in Table 5 than seller preference as motivation for premium bidding.
LIMITATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This study has a number of limitations. First, we only investigated coin auctions in this research, so our results should not be generalized to other areas without care and consideration of the underlying context that is present. We believe this to be true for several main reasons:
□ Unlike most auctions, the strong language and standardized references to "coin condition" and "coin type" in coin collecting facilitates the examination and assessment of rare coins by bidders in online auctions.
□ Trade studies have shown that coin collectors tend to be somewhat older and somewhat more affluent than many other online auction enthusiasts.
□ Rare coins, for the most part, sell for under $100. Thus, our results may not be applicable to more expensive products sold in online auctions, such as automobiles (Lee, 1999) .
Nonetheless, we assert that this research yields insights that are relevant for understanding other analogous auction formats, and call for future research into premium bidding within other auction formats.
Second, we have shown now an operationalization for premium bidding to proxy for reserve price shilling can be effective. However, such an operationalization is predisposed to include more cases where the shill bids in extremely high dollar amounts (as a ratio of the common value). It does not favor the fewer cases where the shill bids in small dollar amounts, below the current dollar bid level of identical items sold in other auctions. However, for our results, this limitation results in a more conservative estimate of shilling behavior. So we believe that the results would actually be stronger than indicated by the present study if we had definitive data indicating whether each seller actually was a shill bidder. Furthermore, this limitation makes it difficult to use this methodology to catch competitive shilling (as opposed to reserve price shilling) that occurs in the final minutes of an auction. Thus, we also call for a different empirical methodology to be developed that can be used to test for the presence of competitive shilling as auctions come to a close.
Third, we only examined bidding and seller behavior on eBay, and not other auctions.
However, many competing auctions, such as Amazon and Yahoo!, have mimicked eBay's fee structure and auction design. So though we only studied eBay, our results should carry through to many other auctions that look to eBay for guidance on online auction system design.
CONCLUSION
This paper is the first to examine the effect that a premium bid, usually entered in the middle of an auction and usually not the winning bid, has upon the final selling price in online auctions. We develop a weighted least squares regression empirical model to examine the contrary predictions made by extensions to existing auction theory in an attempt to explain why premium bids can affect the final selling price. We find that a premium bid acts as a signal to other bidders that a higher bid is appropriate.
As with Kauffman and Wood's (forthcoming) research, we find that premium bidding is best motivated and explained by reserve price shilling, where a bidder enters a low starting bid and then bids on his own item to avoid paying auction house fees that are tied to starting bid level.
We also examine two other likely explanations for premium bidding (e.g., bounded rationality and seller preference), and find that reserve price shilling is more consistent with the statistical results than the other two explanations.
Our findings suggest that not only are sellers motivated by eBay's fee structure to enter a reserve price shill bid, but doing so may make their auction more attractive to other bidders who look at premium bids as a signal of an item's worth within an auction. As such, reserve price shilling may have a more detrimental effect than only avoiding auction house fees.
Reputation and controls on opportunistic behavior are important to maintaining viable market transactions. As such, this research can be viewed as a call to auction houses on the Internet to place more controls on user identification and user activities to avoid the practice of shilling.
